Russian vassalization of Ukraine

[Saz]

[The Comrade]

[Dylan]

I strongly disagree with his point re devolution. Many proxies would rather not have been. The resulting tug and pull could often be quite tumultuous. You seem to view the Cold War map as red versus blue, but there existed gradations and some states who didn't want to be red or blue.

Moving to today, regional blocs of willingly affiliate powers will likely have more concrete interests in common than blocs tied by varying adherence to something as abstract as economic ideology. This should result in more coherent and predictable regional actions in the long term.

Besides, all of these countries should have been engaged with diplomatically during the Cold War. The fact that we directed our attention to other endeavors doesn't mean such complexities didn't exist. It means we didn't pay them sufficient attention.

Basically, western attention has shifted to smaller bits that existed even during the Cold War, we were just too focused on the big bit to worry about it. You think just because we didn't pay attention before, it didn't exist. This is wrong.

You're confusing changing priorities with a changing geopolitical landscape.

[exploited]

[exploited]

[Dylan]

[exploited]

[Dylan]

[broken robot]

[broken robot]

i want to take on ex's points, but first by distinguishing complexity on what level: alliances among nation-states or as you say emergent global phenomena that transcend traditional boundaries of the nation-state?

if we were to take the first, there are many scholars who would argue that the US has in fact achieved a universal hegemony after the cold war. peter gowan for example argues that the very expansion of us power is now correlated with the logic of globalization, so endemic and pervasive it has become. others such as hardt and negri argue there is now a diffuse, deterritorialized empire that encompasses the world. critics of hardt and negri have pointed out that "empire" is no less than us hegemony itself, as evidenced by the invasions of iraq and afghanistan. the point though is that i don't know of a single author who's claimed that there is a serious global competitor to the US. debates focus more on whether neoliberal globalization supersedes the US's power, or whether it's an expression of it. this is why i originally stated that we have to distinguish between regional as opposed to global great power conflicts.

in this regard, the world after the cold war has in fact become drastically simplified as competition between nation-states is increasingly confined to regional power assertion, in contrast to the cold war proxy wars that criss-crossed the globe fought by china, the ussr, and the US in places such as nicaragua, angola, and vietnam. to go back to the latter, remember that there were splits within the communist world. china and russia, for example, most emphatically did not get along after the sino-soviet split in the 1960s. for example, china supported angolan rebels along with the US and south africa against a communist-led angolan government backed by cuba and the soviets throughout the 1970s and 1980s. the same communist government invaded congo, a regional US ally, which prompted France to send in Moroccan legionnaires to defend the congo. how do you get much more confusing and complicated than that? after the cold war there is still conflict between nation-states but the scale has shifted to a lower level. until china starts sending its carriers to conquer kenya, i'll maintain this position. (basically i'm dressing up dylan's point about "pinpricks")

now let's take the second level, whether complexity is caused by the emergence of global problems such as climate change, terrorism, diseases such as AIDS, etc. james rosenau famously argued that these emergent issues and the subsequent "turbulence" of the late/post-Cold War period has undermined traditional boundaries of the nation-state. in contrast however one could argue that at the same time there have always been global problems. global institutions that depend on the sovereignty of states have been created precisely to respond to these issues. right after world war II for example the bretton woods institutions--international bank for reconstruction and development (ibrd, later the world bank) and international monetary fund--were set up to prevent another great depression and to regulate international finance.

these institutions and problems don't necessarily undermine the existing geopolitical order of nation-states. they may in fact strengthen their boundaries. many developing countries have criticized the fact for example that the imf, world trade organization and other global institutions impose subsidy cuts while more powerful countries such as the US continue to subsidize domestic interests such as agriculture. moreover in areas such as policing and security, the nation-state may be strengthened by new counter-terror discourses, enabling governments to increase surveillance of their populations and increase domestic security measures. "the internet has transcended nation-states!" enter NSA. boom, argument sunk. also, look at the us-mexico border wall. the proper angle to view this from then is not "is the nation-state weaker or stronger" in some general, unverifiable sense, but to operationalize it as a question that can actually be researched. how has it been strengthened in some respects and weakened in others?

more generally, we need to take into account the asymmetry of sovereignty, the fact that rich countries for example can maintain their power and influence. i don't think you can really "prove" the world is more complex based on global problems given that a) many of these kinds of issues have always existed--ie. the fallout from the great depression, ww II, and the creation of bretton woods institutions, and b) nation-states have not unilaterally declined; in fact they may have increased their power in some respects.

anyways, i'd probably come closest to agreeing with dylan that our priorities have changed. i would add that geopolitical realities have also changed, but in such a way as to undermine both global conflict between great powers and to strengthen the nation-state in some areas, weaken it in others. whether the world is more or less complex than during the cold war isn't really a useful question. but one thing i can say for certain is that a) the nation-state is no less meaningful, and b) i don't think there's been some qualitative shift in the scale of global problems that creates a whole new realm of complexity, interdependence, whatever you want to call it. maybe when aliens invade and the world is truly united against a common enemy!